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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of unreliable and biased information is a sig-
nificant problem on the Internet. To assess the credibility of the
information retrieved from news websites and other sources, users
often resort to social platforms looking for confirmation with trust-
worthy parties. However, users may be faced with considerable
obstacles posed by the platform provider, who can prevent access
to certain content. This paper presents DClaims, a system that pro-
vides a censorship-resistant distributed service for the exchange
of information over the Internet using web annotations. DClaims’
fully decentralized architecture relies on Inter-Planetary File Sys-
tem (IPFS) and Ethereum blockchain, both of which offer desirable
censorship resistant properties. DClaims is implemented as a web
annotations browser extension which allows for the classification
of news articles, on news websites. From our evaluation of the sys-
tem, we conclude that a large scale implementation of the system
is practical and economically viable.
1 INTRODUCTION
The web plays a fundamental role in the exchange of informa-
tion in the modern society supported by social media and news
websites [18]. Ironically, flooded by a deluge of information and
plagued by the propagation of false or biased news, individuals
have experienced growing difficulty in accessing reliable sources
of information – to the point of the identification and classification
of low-quality information has become one of the most active ar-
eas of research [13, 37, 49, 61]. As a result, to access information
and validate its credibility, people tend to resort to social networks
and similar platforms to read posts from reliable sources, exchange
commentaries with trustworthy parties, access first-hand content,
or cross-check information that appears in news outlets.
However, users’ exposure to new messages is largely controlled
by platform providers like Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram. Even
though the users have the freedom to select who to follow in the
network, the platform provider decides on the contents that each
user sees based on heuristics and proprietary algorithms. On the
other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that platform providers are
prone to pressure by political or economical agents, and sometimes
are driven by ideological motivations to hide messages or block
certain users. In fact, several instances of censorship treatment of
information have recently come to light involving major social
network providers, either motivated by bias [47], or attacks by
platform users who flag content as abusive in an attempt to force the
platform to delete it [51]. Ironically, even though the original data
may remain accessible to end-users via direct URLs, the constant
sharing of new information and the increasing dependency on
social networks for content dissemination tends to narrow down
users’ world view which is molded according to the information
displayed to them by the platform and will ultimately impair users’
ability to freely and openly access important information. As such,
our goal is to study an alternative approach to social networks as a
way to offering users unrestricted access to information.
Over the last few years, blockchain [42] has emerged as a pow-
erful technology to avoid the dependency on centralized parties for
preserving the integrity of globally shared state. Used for multiple
applications [19], we hypothesize that blockchain can also serve as
a corner stone for overcoming the censorship policies potentially
implemented by social networks and other centralized informa-
tion relay platforms. In particular, we argue that by leveraging
a blockchain for building a reliable and open index of messages
between producers and consumers of information, then central-
ized platform providers will not be able to exert their influence in
eclipsing undesirable messages from end-users.
Using blockchain for such a purpose, however, poses several tech-
nical challenges. First, we face scalability issues since blockchain
technology cannot sustain a high transaction rate. Second, the costs
tend to be high, because transactions involve a monetary price and
an attractive incentive model must be found in order to foster the
deployment of such a system. Storage in the blockchain is also a
problem, given that the transaction costs tend to increase with the
amount of data that gets stored. It is also necessary to deal with po-
tential adversaries aiming at polluting the blockchain with useless
messages in an attempt tomake the relevant messages more difficult
to retrieve by the end-users. The performance is also an important
requirement because submitting new messages and retrieving them
must not introduce such overheads that will dramatically hinder the
user experience. Lastly, the mechanisms for exchanging messages
and make them reach the end-users should not depend on existing
social networks or require changes to the original news outlet sites
while at the same time offering a user-friendly interface.
In this paper we address these challenges by designing, imple-
menting, and evaluating a system named DClaims. DClaims pro-
vides a censorship-resistant distributed service for the exchange
of information over the Internet using web annotations, which al-
low us to exchange messages in a user-friendly manner in a fully
distributed fashion. Web annotations [17] are defined in a W3C
standard, and offer a new way of interacting with information on
the web that empowers users to highlight text on the web sites
they visit, create sticky notes or comment specific parts of a web
page, and share it with friends. In a typical scenario, a user visiting
a news webpage article that shows portions of text highlighted by
her friends and when she places her mouse over text highlights she
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sees comments made by the users about that text. Web annotations
allow for the creation of a new layer of data, on top of the existing
websites, without changing the original resources.
To provide open and censorship-free access to web annotations,
DClaims features a fully decentralized architecture based on sev-
eral components. First, we use the Ethereum [14] blockchain to
keep a permanent, canonical record of all the annotations made.
These records that are assured to be fresh and ordered. Given that
this blockchain is very large and entirely decentralized, it is very
difficult to be controlled by any government authority or media
outlet. These properties guarantee that every time a user queries
the system, he is receiving the latest information, unfiltered and
uncensored. Second, we use Inter-Planetary File System (IPFS) [7],
a distributed file system where data is stored and scattered all
across the web. IPFS offers strong integrity assurances of the files it
stores. That happens because the link to an IPFS file depends on the
content of the file rather than the file’s location. To combine the
feature set of web annotations, with the integrity and censorship
resistance assurances of IPFS and the ordered registry and fresh-
ness of Ethereum, our system stores web annotations on IPFS and
records the IPFS links of these files on Ethereum. Most importantly,
DClaims includes additional components, named publishers, which
reduce the costs of Ethereum transactions and improve the system
scalability. Publishers incorporate mechanisms to prevent publisher
misbehavior and to protect against spurious content.
We have implemented and evaluated DClaims. We found that
the system performs well, in particular that the web browsing expe-
rience of end-users is not significantly affected. We also analyzed
the costs of a full-scale deployment of DClaims using the activity
level of Facebook’s news pages as an estimate for expected demand
which suggests that our system is economically viable.
2 BUILDING BLOCKS
The goal of our work is to build a system that allows for uncen-
sored access to web annotations on the Internet by eliminating
central points of control where a powerful actor can exert pressure
to fabricate, modify, or suppress exchanged messages. Examples of
such actors include governments or powerful media organizations.
In addition, our system must provide: authenticity and integrity
assurances regarding the published web annotations, data perma-
nence and portability with respect to immutability of links to web
annotations, financial cost efficiency, and scalability.
We present the three main building blocks that we leverage to
build our system: Web Annotation Data Model, Ethereum, and IPFS.
2.1 Ethereum
The Ethereum [14, 60] blockchain is the core building block of
DClaims. It consists of a blockchain, which is a distributed system
that runs on a peer-to-peer network with the goal of maintaining
common state in a trustless manner, that is, without trusting in any
single node to act correctly. Agreement on the state is achieved
through a consensus protocol, based on proof-of-work.
Ethereum’s purpose is to run a global virtual machine on the
blockchain that anyone can use by paying a small fee. This virtual
machine runs programs, called smart-contracts written in Solidity
and compiled into EVM Bytecode. All the nodes in the Ethereum
network run the same operations. Since the virtual machine is deter-
ministic (for a given input, the output is always the same), all nodes
will reach the same state, which results in the network achieving
consensus. Smart-contracts are Turing-complete which provides
flexibility and allows for the creation of arbitrary programs.
Ethereum exhibits strong censorship resistance features: Ethereum
nodes are geographically spread and controlled by different par-
ties. However, important limitations need to be overcome. The first
challenge is minimizing the data stored on the blockchain, for it is
extremely expensive. The second challenge is minimizing the num-
ber of transactions so that Ethereum’s 20 transaction per second
limitation does not turn into a bottleneck in the system.
2.2 IPFS
As described, storing data on a blockchain is expensive. IPFS offers
a good solution to that problem. The Interplanetary File-System
(IPFS) [7] is a decentralized, peer-to-peer file system. The IPFS
network is made of IPFS nodes. An IPFS node is a client running
the IPFS daemon, which stores files in its local IPFS repository (a
datastore used by the IPFS daemon) and makes those files available
to the rest of the network.
Data is addressed by IPFS links, which are hashes of the con-
tent they address. Routing is done through a distributed hash table.
Transport is done by establishing direct, peer-to-peer, connections
between nodes. IPFS offers desirable features for censorship resis-
tance. First, it is logically decentralized, meaning it can work in
local area networks, disconnected from the Internet. Second, it does
not rely on DNS or Certificate Authorities. Third, even if only one
node in the network has the requested file, all the other nodes can
access it. Finally, all files are cryptographically verified.
2.3 Web Annotation Data Model
To allow for the decentralized exchanging of messages between
users without depending on social network platforms or requiring
changes to newsweb sites, we leverage the web annotation standard
specified by the W3C [17]. It specifies the creation of a new layer of
data, on top of the existing websites, without changing the original
resources. This layer can be used to provide context, clarification,
additional information about the resource a person is viewing.
Several types of representations for web annotations are sup-
ported, such as text or media (sound, images or videos). The target
can be any HTML element in the webpage. In our work, we adopt
the W3C web annotation specification in order to preserve interop-
erability between our system and other web annotation services.
3 DESIGN
We introduce DClaims. We start by presenting its architecture, and
then describe the most relevant aspects of its design in turn.
3.1 Architecture
Figure 1 represents the architecture of our system. Essentially,
DClaims consists of four main components: client, publisher, IPFS,
and Ethereum. Together, these components constitute the DClaims
platform on top of which applications can be built. By leveraging
the underlying platform services, applications allow end-users to
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Figure 1: DClaims architecture
create, store and share web annotations in a decentralized and
censorship-resistant way.
More specifically, a DClaims application consists of a browser
extension that runs on end-users’ browsers. Depending on its spe-
cific functionality, an application may dynamically instrument web
pages so as to extend their respective UIs with web annotation
widgets, or provide such features through an API that web pages
can explicitly use. The application code implements specific logic
for generating new annotations, submitting them to the DClaims
platform, retrieving, and displaying them to the end-user. Multiple
applications are allowed to use the system.
To interact with the DClaims platform, an application must be
linked with a library named client. The client provides a simple
API and implements common logic for the submission of requests
to the backend for storing annotations and make them accessible
to DClaims’ users. The backend consists of IPFS and Ethereum
blockchain and is responsible for providing a censorship-resistant
storage and access medium for the system’s state, namely annota-
tions and metadata. According to the instructions of the application,
the client can submit annotations to backend either directly by com-
municating with IPFS and Ethereum, or indirectly by relying on
a special DClaims proxy named publisher. There can be multiple
publishers. Publishers consist of servers maintained by third-parties
and are responsible for issuing annotations on clients’ behalf for
cost efficiency and scalability reasons, which will be clarified later
in the paper. The client also implements common logic for user
authentication and cryptographic validation of annotations.
3.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
The security goals of our system are threefold: protect the integrity
of exchanged web annotations, guarantee unrestricted access to
them by end-users, and provide strong authenticity assurances.
To this end, we make several assumptions. First, we trust the
client endpoints. We assume that the application, client library,
browser, and OS are correct, in particular with respect to the imple-
mentation of DClaims protocols and security of cryptographic keys
and operations. As part of the trusted computing base (TCB) we also
include Ethereum, which requires that at least 50% of the hashing
power to operate correctly. We depend on Ethereum for guaran-
teeing the integrity of the execution of DClaims smart-contracts
and preserving the freshness of the smart-contracts’ internal state,
e.g., by preventing rollback attacks. With regards to IPFS, DClaims
uses it for state replication and only requires a single data copy to
be preserved on any given IPFS node to ensure data persistence
and accessibility. The integrity of data objects stored on IPFS can
be verified by the clients. Lastly, we assume that the publisher
may deviate from the correct behavior. If such happens, the overall
censorship-resistance guarantees offered by the system must not
be affected but temporarily. Thus, we exclude the publisher from
the TCB.
We model our adversary as follows. The adversary may try to
intercept and / or tamper with any communications taken place
between parties of the DClaims ecosystem. The adversary may
attempt to impersonate a legitimate publisher or deploy a mali-
cious publisher. Such a publisher could launch several attacks, such
as altering or dropping annotation requests submitted by clients,
which would result in either modifying the content of legitimate
annotations or preventing them from being persistently stored on
the backend. Note that we are not contemplating an attacker model
which actively engages in censorship techniques at the transport
level (such as IP blocking, packet dropping or content inspection).
3.3 System Operation
We start the description of DClaims by presenting its basic opera-
tion from the end-user’s point of view, which is centered around
the life cycle of web annotations. Throughout its life cycle, a web
annotation is handled by four entities: creator, issuer, verifier and
viewer. The creator is responsible for the creation of a new web
annotation. The issuer submits the annotation to the backend. A
verifier retrieves the annotation from the backend and verifies its
authenticity. Finally, a viewer displays the annotation on aweb page.
For each annotation, there can be multiple verifiers and viewers.
Figure 2 illustrates this process for a simple application, named
DClaims-News, whose goal is to classify online news articles. This
example involves two users Alice and Bob, both of them have in-
stalled DClaims-News on their browsers. First, Alice visits a news
website and reads an article. DClaims-News instruments the ar-
ticle’s web page so as to allow Alice to classify the information
therein contained with one of two possible tags: true, or false. Upon
receiving the input, DClaims-News (the creator) creates a new an-
notation based on Alice’s choice, and forwards it to a publisher
(the issuer), which will submit the annotation to the backend. Later,
Bob visits the same article news article website. Upon opening
the article’s website and Bob visits the respective new’s web page,
DClaims-News instruments that page on the fly with a button that
allows Bob to read the classifications attached to that article, which
in the background leverages the local client (the verifier) to retrieve
the article’s annotations and verify them. When Bob presses the
button, DClaims-News (the viewer) displays the existing classifi-
cations on a new pop-up window allowing Bob to browse them
through and checking who has authored each classification. In this
case, he could see Alice’s classification of the article. Next, we use
this example to present the design details of DClaims.
3.4 Data Structures
DClaims uses three main data structures to manage the system’s
state. One of these data structures is called claim and it is used
primarily to encapsulate web annotations provided by applications
along with additional metadata, e.g., digital signatures and user
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Figure 2: DClaims-News basic workflow: Alice writes a web annotation on a news article which is then read by Bob.
identification. To foster interoperability with other decentralized
applications, claims are stored inside Verifiable Claims [55], a data
specification standard defined by W3C which allows for express-
ing rich sets of signed statements. DClaims adopts this data model
for the representation of claims, which in turn have four different
formats for four different purposes: enclosing web annotations,
batching publisher requests, revoking claims, and filing publisher
complaints. The web annotation claim format can be further cus-
tomized according to the application’s needs, e.g., to represent
simple true / false statements, or arbitrarily complex ones (e.g.,
structured records, text, images, etc.).
The second important data structure is an Ethereum smart-
contract, whose function is to keep track of the claims issued.
Essentially, whenever claims are stored on IPFS, the links (i.e., self-
describing content hashes, with hashing function and length infor-
mation embedded) to these claims are put inside the smart-contract.
Figure 3 represents the smart-contract’s data structure that main-
tains the claims’ IPFS links for the DClaims-News application. The
smart-contract holds a hash list where the key is named topic. The
list contains the IPFS links, issuer addresses, and time stamps of all
the claims about that topic. The topic can be represented by an URL,
e.g., web annotations for https://www.acme.com/index.html fall
under the same topic. In this example, the represented annotations
correspond to classifications of the article as being true or false.
The third relevant data structure is a second Ethereum smart-
contract, whose function is to maintain a directory of all publishers
in the system and to keep track of the complaint claims that might
have been issued against publishers. Section 3.9 elaborates further
on this topic. To distinguish between both DClaims smart-contracts,
we refer to the former as web annotation smart-contract and to the
latter as publisher registry smart-contract. Since the web annotation
smart-contract plays a more prominent role in the system, in the
rest of the paper we refer to it simply as “the” DClaims’ Ethereum
smart-contract unless stated otherwise.
3.5 Claim Management Operations
We now revisit the web annotation operations of Section 3.3 and
provide additional details on how they work. We omit further de-
tails about the visualization operation because it is application-
dependent, and introduce a new operation for claim revocation.
Claim creation: For claim creation, we only need to mention that
the creator adds a signature of the claim’s content. This signature
allows the claim’s validators to check its authenticity and integrity.
Claim issuance: To issue a claim to the backend, the issuer per-
forms three steps: first, it signs the claim with its private key, then
it must store the claim on IPFS so as to obtain the respective IPFS
link to the claim, and then insert the link into the hashlist of the
smart-contract. When a new claim is issued, the smart-contract uses
the issuer’s Ethereum wallet address as identity proof, meaning
that that wallet address is automatically associated with that claim.
Depending on who issued the claim, the wallet address associated
with the claim may belong to the publisher or to the user who has
created the claim. The smart contract contains a record of the issuer
ID which serves to identify the entity who paid for the transaction
and issued the claim. On the other hand the ID on the claim itself
identifies the user who has provided the enclosed web annotation.
Claim revocation: DClaims allows for revoking previously issued
claims. Revoking a claim consists of issuing a special revocation
claim, which is tagged with revocation type and has a payload that
includes the UID of the claim to be revoked. This claim is issued
just like any other web annotation claim, either by a client or by a
publisher; it is stored on IPFS and kept track of on the Ethereum
smart-contract (see Figure 3). To prevent an attacker from revok-
ing claims arbitrarily, a revocation claim must have been created
(and signed) by the creator of the claim to be revoked. To enforce
this condition, rather than performing this check inside the smart-
contract (which would be very costly and non-scalable), we allow
anyone to submit arbitrary revocation claims into the system and
let the test be performed at the verification stage by the clients. To
avoid attackers from flooding the system with bogus revocation
claims, DClaims implements a defense mechanism described in
Section 3.10. Lastly, note that, since IPFS does not enforce access
control to stored objects, once a given claim has been uploaded onto
IPFS, it can be accessed and replicated by anyone in the network.
For this reason, DClaims does not provide a mechanism for delet-
ing claims, only for revoking. Nevertheless, if end-users intend to
share private claims, this can be achieved by encrypting the claims’
payload and sharing the decryption keys with trusted users.
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Claim verification: This operation is invoked by the application
before displaying the annotations to the user and requires several
steps. First, the client needs to retrieve the claims of a particular
topic. To this end, it queries the smart-contract to get the IPFS links
of the claims associated with a topic indicated by the application
and then fetches the respective files from IPFS. In this process,
after acquiring the claims’ IPFS links from the smart-contract, IPFS
performs a first level of verification to check that the link (hash) of
the claim matches its content. Upon receiving the claims, a second
step of verification is to filter the claims. Filtering allows end-users
to select whose claims they want to see, so all the claims from
issuers who are not white-listed by the user are discarded. Filtering
also helps evict spurious claims (see Section 3.10). The third step of
verification is to check the claim’s signature. The client checks that
the public key used to sign the claim is the same as the one in the
Issuer ID field. The last verification step consists of ensuring that the
claim has not been revoked. If all these checkpoints are passed, the
claim is considered valid and passed on to the application. The order
through which the verification is made was deliberately chosen
with performance in mind.
3.6 The Publishers Network
Issuing a claim by uploading its content to IPFS and respectively
updating the smart-contract on Ethereum can be done directly by
the client. However, this approach can have several shortcomings.
First, the claim issuing costs are very high, because the claim creator
needs to pay the price of a single Ethereum transaction in order to
update the smart-contract’s state with the claim’s IPFS link, price
which is expensive (about 0.25USD per claim).
Second, this method may hinder the scalability of DClaims. The
reason is that, as the rate of created claims increases, the Ethereum
network will eventually reach a limit on the number of transactions
that can be processed. The current limit is around 20 transactions
per second, creating a potential bottleneck in the DClaims sys-
tem. Moreover, by reaching this limit, the gas price spikes. This
effect occurs because since transaction prices tend to escalate as
the transaction rate approaches the limit.
A third issue is a limited claim availability. After issuing a claim,
only a copy of that claim exists on the creator’s computer, which
acts as an IPFS node. However, IPFS does not automatically repli-
cate the data across the network; it is only when IPFS nodes request
the content, that new copies are generated and cached in the IPFS
network. As a result, the claim creator would need to be perma-
nently connected to the Internet until a sufficient number of claim
replicas had been disseminated across the IPFS network, otherwise
end-users may not be able to retrieve the claim.
To overcome these limitations, DClaims provides an alternative,
and preferable, way for indirect claim issuance based on a network
of dedicated nodes called publishers. Publishers act as proxies be-
tween applications and the DClaims backend systems, i.e., IPFS
and Ethereum. To address the aforementioned shortcomings, a pub-
lisher can proxy two kinds of requests by applications: requests for
claim issuance, and requests for claim retrieval. First, when receiv-
ing issuing requests from multiple clients, a publisher can batch
them into a single Ethereum transaction, which not only reduces
the price per claim, but also reduces the overall number of transac-
tion requests to Ethereum thereby improving scalability. Second, a
publisher can also act as an IPFS node serving as a storage provider
for claim copies serving content on behalf of claim creators.
3.7 Incentives for Publishers
We envision that publishers will be deployed and maintained by
third-party publisher providers, who must support the maintenance
costs of the system, including the costs of Ethereum transactions
responsible for serving claim issuing requests and the claim stor-
age costs. Thus, publisher providers require an attractive incentive
model and a source of revenue that can cover these expenses. Dif-
ferent publisher providers can adopt different financial models. We
discuss two possible models for supporting the publisher network:
Donations: A viable option is to run a community-funded cam-
paign to subsidize the publisher network. In Section 6.2, we estimate
that the cost of running a full-scale deployment of DClaims would
be 5 to 6 times lower than the one of Wikipedia [59], which adopts
a donations-based financial model.
Pay-as-you-go: An alternative model is to have users pay for issu-
ing their web annotations. For instance, supposing that a publisher
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batches 100 claims from 100 users into a single Ethereum transac-
tion priced 0.25USD, each user would pay 0.0025USD, which seems
to be a reasonable price to pay for a censorship-resistant web an-
notations service. Publishers can charge regular payments to users
(PayPal, credit card), or employ more sophisticated methods, such
as requiring users to mine some cryptocurrency on their website.
3.8 Operations Involving Publishers
We imagine the publisher network to be made up of a reasonable
number of publishers (between 10 and 100). Different publishers
may charge different pricing schemes for claim issuance and storage
services. End-users are free to select preferred publisher providers.
Next, we present the most relevant operations involving publish-
ers, namely those involved in issuing and storing claims and in
managing membership of the publisher network.
When a publisher is used as proxy, the claim issuing process
changes in two main ways. First, rather than interacting directly
with IPFS and Ethereum, a client sends a claim issuance request
to the publisher. The publisher batches claims together and issues
them all in the same Ethereum transaction. Publishers can set a
threshold on the number of claims to include in a given batch. Sec-
ond, in order to improve the claim availability in the IPFS network,
the publisher stores a copy of the claim locally, and propagates
similar requests to other publishers according to some pre-defined
replication policy (e.g., three randomly distributed copies). Each
publisher effectively runs an IPFS node which means that it can
serve future claim requests from its local store. The publisher and
the claim creator agree upon the storage policy that must be en-
forced, e.g., preserve a local copy for at least 1 month. Note that
the claim creator will always keep a local copy of the claim.
With regard to operations involving publisher discovery and
membership management (i.e., add and remove publishers), a sim-
ple approach would be to run a public directory service on a web
site keeping the IPs and certificates of all publishers of the net-
work. However, to prevent depending on a centralized entity which
can engage in censorship practices (e.g., by controlling publisher
providers’ ingress), DClaims keeps the publisher directory on an
independent Ethereum smart-contract (the publisher registry smart-
contract) where publishers must register. When starting its activity,
a publisher makes a transaction to that contract, adding its IP ad-
dress (or DNS name) and public key certificate to a list. Users and
other publishers can find the newly added publisher by querying
this smart-contract for the list of active publishers.
3.9 Handling Publisher Misbehavior
As explained above, publishers bring significant benefits for DClaims
in terms of cost efficiency, system scalability, and data availabil-
ity. However, DClaims does not depend on publishers’ correctness
for preserving the censorship-resistance properties of the system.
These properties rest upon Ethereum and IPFS only. As a result, we
assume that publishers can misbehave.
An adversarial publisher can try to subvert the system in three
specific ways: by silently refusing to update the Ethereum smart-
contract with the claim’s links received from clients for issuance
(request corruption), by tampering with or modifying the client’s
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Figure 4: Typical publisher complaint flow.
claim issuance request, e.g., registering the IPFS link under a dif-
ferent topic (request corruption), and by not storing a copy of the
claim submitted for issuance by a client and / or refuse to propagate
it further in the publisher network (replica drop).
Although such attacks may cause some disruption in the system,
they can easily be detected and recovered from. Request drops and
request corruption attacks can be detected by the original claim
creator by querying the smart-contract and validate the presence of
the correct claim reference. An adversarial publisher could launch
such attacks in order to save costs with Ethereum transactions
(request drop attack), or to prevent the dissemination of claims due
to their content or authorship (which applies to both attack types).
A replica drop attack can also be detected by retrieving the claim
while keeping the claim creator offline. If the claim has not been
served, it means the publisher has not cached a copy of the claim.
To recover from these attacks the claim creator may select another
publisher to re-issue the claim, or to cache and replicate the claim.
To discourage publisher misbehavior, DClaims incorporates a
reputation-based defense mechanism. This mechanism allow users
to identify and denounce misbehaved publishers while allowing
anyone to attest to the veracity of such reports. The mechanism is
based on the generation of receipts and complaints (see Figure 4).
When an application requests the issuance of a new claim to a
publisher, the publisher returns a receipt. That receipt is a crypto-
graphic proof of the publisher’s acknowledgement of the request
and promise to fulfill it. If a publisher fails to publish the claim, or de-
nies access to it, the user can file a complaint, and warn other users
to stop using that publisher. This information is maintained in the
publisher registry smart-contractm, which maintains publishers’
identities. Users can validate the complaints in the smart-contract,
and disregard false complaints.
3.10 Protection against Spurious Claims
Since the DClaims platform is public, the system is prone to the po-
tential publication of spurious claims. One possible concern would
be that numerous such claims could be generated and pollute the
system in such a way as to make it difficult to identify legitimate
claims rendering the system useless. We present three DClaims
mechanisms that limit the extent of such attacks:
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1. Paid claim issuance:Without using the publisher network, an
adversary willing to upload spurious claims to the system, needs
to pay for Ethereum transaction by itself. The Ethereum transac-
tion price can cost between 0.5 and 1.5 USD, which makes it cost
prohibitive to issue a large number of claims for a DOS attack.
2. Client authentication: This mechanism can be implemented
by the publisher. A user uses a publisher’s service by interacting
with its API. A publisher can choose to authenticate and authorize
a user in order to allow API usage for issuing claims. If a user
issues to many claims and starts abusing the service, a publisher
can de-activate that user’s account.
3. Client-side whitelisting. On the client side, DClaims users are
only exposed to claims generated by users that belong in their
whitelist. To ensure that end-users are not exposed to an excessive
amount of claims, users are required to whitelist the issuers whose
claims they can see. This way if a user goes rogue and posts spurious
claims, other users need only to remove him from their list.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the implementation of the developed software
stack comprising the base DClaims platform (Section 4.1) and the
DClaims-News application (Section 4.2).
4.1 DClaims Platform
As part of the DClaims platform, we implemented the client library,
the publisher software, and Ethereum smart-contracts. To work
with IPFS, we used Go-IPFS [30], which is the software that client
and publishers use to connect to the IPFS network and to run a
local IPFS node. In the client, we also use JS-IPFS-API [36], which is
an IPFS client library written in Javascript and it allows the browser
extension to communicate with the Go-IPFS node running locally.
(Within a few months from the time of this writing, we will be able
to use a Javascript IPFS implementation, which will remove the
need for the user to install and run Go-IPFS; the IPFS node will be
launched by and run inside the browser.) Both the DClaims’ client
and the publisher were written in Javascript. The publisher code
runs on a Node.js web server.
We wrote the Ethereum smart-contracts in Solidity, which is sim-
ilar to Javascript in syntax, but typed. To deploy smart-contracts on
the Ethereum network, it is necessary to interact with an Ethereum
node. On the publisher, we run an Ethereum node in the Node.js
environment using the Go-Ethereum [29] (Geth) client. For the
DClaims client we used Metamask [40], which is a browser ex-
tension that functions as an Ethereum node proxy. Contrary to
Geth, Metamask is not an Ethereum node in that it does not process
transactions. It is instead a gateway to Ethereum nodes being run
by a third party (Infura [33], which runs public Ethereum nodes).
Node.js and Javascript browser applications can connect and inter-
act with an Ethereum node via the Web3 library [58]. In Node.js,
Web3 connects to Geth and in the browser to Metamask. Browser
clients can also choose to run their own Ethereum nodes and not
rely on Infura’s. To do that, they simply need to configure their
Geth clients on Metamask.
4.2 DClaims-News Application
As a proof of concept, we built the web annotation application for
news websites introduced in Section 3.3, which allows users to
classify, and view classifications, on news articles. This application,
named DClaims-News, consists of a browser extension for Chrome
and was written in Javascript. It implements a visual overlay that is
placed on top of the news websites, which allows users to interact
with the application. To draw the visual elements (e.g., buttons to
interact with the application) we injected several Javascript files
(including the Bootstrap[11] and jQuery[35] libraries) via a Chrome
browser extension[31] to change the HTML of the web pages.
The interaction of DClaims-News with the DClaims platform
is mediated by the DClaims client library. Claim issuance can be
performed directly by the application or mediated by a publisher.
When issuing a claim, even if using publishers, the users must sign
in using its EthereumWallet Address. To sign and verify signatures
we used the methods made available in the browser environment by
Metamask. When a user creates a claim (by classifying an article),
a pop-up box from Metamask appears, showing the piece of data
the user is about to sign.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We assess to what extent DClaims can serve as a viable alternative
to current web commentary platforms, such as social networks. To
that end, we are primarily interested in evaluating the performance
of the DClaims-News browser extension (Section 5.2) and DClaims
backend components, namely Ethereum and IPFS (Section 5.3).
5.1 Methodology
To evaluate the performance of DClaims-News, we have injected
Javascript to measure the loading time of the webpage. The mea-
sured values correspond to the elapsed time between two events
provided by the browser: requestStart and loadEventEnd. For
our tests, each webpage was loaded thirty times on each condition
(with and without DClaims running). Our experiments were con-
ducted on a computer equipped with 2.4GHz CPU and 8GBmemory
connected to a 20Mb network. The web extension was connected
to the IPFS network through a daemon running locally on the com-
puter and connected to an Ethereum testnet via Metamask, a web
extension that acts as an Ethereum proxy.
To measure the performance of IPFS and Ethereum, we emulated
a regular usage by ordinary users by running a DClaims client
wrapper on sixty nodes on Amazon Web Services. Each node had 4
GB of memory and had IPFS and Go-Ethereum running on Docker
containers. This experiment started by having each node randomly
issuing five claims, each about a randomly selected article (from
a pre-selected list of thirty, which corresponded to the articles
on SkyNews’ webpage on January 28th 2018). To avoid the extra
burden of configuring a different account on each node, the claims
were issued using the same Ethereum address. After the claims have
been issued, each node started fetching claims, randomly selecting
an article and retrieving all the claims for that article. Each node
selected a new article every 10 seconds. We ran this experiment for
twenty minutes, which resulted in each node querying 120 articles.
The overlap (querying 120 articles from a list of 60) was intentional
to increase the odds of every article being queried at least once.
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Figure 6: Webpage load time vs. number of articles.
5.2 Performance of the Web Client
In this section, we report the performance results of our DClaim-
News application. To provide an idea of the impact of DClaims to
end-users’ experience, we adapted our web extension to support
three websites: SkyNews [50], New York Times (NYT) [52], and
Instituto Superior Técnico (IST) [34], which is the news front page
of a university website.
Figure 5 shows the time that the three news websites take to
load completely, with and without DClaims-News enabled. The
overhead DClaims introduced varies between 0.4 seconds and 2
seconds and corresponds to the time that the web extension needs
to connect to an IPFS node, to an Ethereum node and then, for each
article, it needs to generate the news article ID (which is the SHA-3
hash of the referenced news article’s URL). Note, however, that this
is not the latency perceived by the user, since this operation takes
place in background while the web page is being rendered to the
user. From our interaction with these sites using DClaims-News,
we did not perceive a dramatic degradation of the user experience,
as the original elements of the website (news titles, images, among
others) appear just as fast as they did before, only the elements
introduced by DClaims (view claims button, claims counter) take
longer to appear.
To better understand the impact that the number of news articles
had on performance, we conducted a benchmark test. We used a
stripped-down version of an example news website as a basis and
created ten different versions of the website, each one with ten more
articles than the previous one. The results in Figure 6 show that the
overhead by DClaims increases linearly with the number of articles
of each page. Surprisingly, Figure 5 apparently contradicts this
insight: since Sky News’ website has more than double the number
of news articles than IST’s (19 from IST, 42 from Sky News), we
expected the former to take longer to load than the latter; however,
the opposite occurs. We found that the determining factor in the
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Figure 8: Time to retrieve claim list from Ethereum.
website’s loading time is the Javascript embedded on that page.
This is noticeable in NYT’s website, where the standard deviation
is exceptionally high due to its substantial amount JavaScript code.
5.3 Performance of IPFS and Ethereum
IPFS and Ethereum are a crucial part of DClaims since claims are per-
sistently maintained in these systems. For that reason, we aimed to
evaluate their performance concerning the time it takes to retrieve
claims. Note that the evaluation of the time it takes to issue claims
is not as relevant since most of the time is spent on waiting for
Ethereum’s transaction confirmation and not DClaims’ operations.
The details of the experimental setup are presented in Section 5.1.
We clarify only that process of retrieving claims from DClaims, for
a given article, starts by retrieving the list of claim IPFS links (where
retrieving each link corresponds to an Ethereum call) followed by
retrieving each claim from IPFS. To evaluate the time claims take
to be retrieved, we measured the time it takes, for a given article, to
get a list of claim links from Ethereum as well as the time it takes
to retrieve individual claims from IPFS.
Figures 7 and 8 present our results. Figure 7 shows that the time to
fetch claims from IPFS decreases over time. After elapsed 4 minutes,
the claim fetching time falls below 100ms. This trend is explained by
the fact that, over time, more claim replicas get cached across IPFS
nodes which means that fetching requests can be served from local
or nearby IPFS nodes therefore reducing latency. Figure 8 displays
the time to retrieve the list of claims from Ethereum. In the first
minute of the experiment, the values are remarkably higher than
in the rest of the elapsed time. We attribute this to Geth (Ethereum
daemon) establishing connections to other nodes in preparation
for querying them for information. After having established the
connections to other nodes, the requests to Ethereum take about
100ms to be completed. The outliers in minutes 15 and 17 were
due to some node’s Geth losing connection to other nodes. This
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Facebook Data
Time duration analyzed (hours) 24
Number of pages analyzed 4
Average number of followers per page (Millions) 27
Total number of posts analyzed 200
Total number of interactions 1214549
Average number of posts (per page, per day) 50
Average number of interactions (per post, per day) 6073
Average number of interactions (per page, per day) 303637
Average length of comment (characters) 148
Table 1: Activity of news pages on Facebook
occurs due to a bug in the Geth client’s sync mechanism chosen by
us. To reduce AWS costs, we used a faster, experimental, syncing
mechanism, which is sometimes unstable and crashed the daemon.
The system had to recover from the crash. The same would not
occur in a production scenario, as the full sync method would
be used. From these results, we find that in their steady states,
individual requests to IPFS and Ethereum can be served efficiently
with a latency of around 100ms.
6 COST ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the costs of a full-scale deployment of
DClaims, which essentially correspond to the costs of sustaining the
publishers network. We start, in Section 6.1, by estimating the level
of activity that our system would have to endure, using Facebook
data to model the potential workload. Next, in Section 6.2, we
calculate the costs of publisher resources based on the considered
activity level. Finally, in Section 6.3, we provide an analysis of the
cost of the system, offering an example as to how it compares to
real-world systems in use today.
6.1 Analysis of News Pages on Facebook
We analyzed Facebook data to learn the level of activity our system
would have to support. In our system, users perform a task similar
to the one of commenting on Facebook posts. For this reason, we
decided to use the rate of interactions (comments, likes, reactions)
on four of the most active Facebook’s News organization pages
to model the activity level that we expect in our system. In other
words, we analyzed the rate of interaction that end-users have with
these pages, and aim to use these activity levels to estimate the cost
and performance of our system on a real setting.
In terms of methodology, we used the Facebook Graph API [25]
to analyze the posts of four of the largest Facebook news pages
(CNN, Fox News, The New York Times and BBC News), which
averages 27 million users each, during 24 hours (a limitation of the
API). For each Facebook post on these pages, we obtained all the
comments and a count of the number of likes and reactions.
From the collected dataset we calculated the values in Table 1. It
shows that, on average, each news Facebook page posts 50 news
articles per day, and each post receives around 6073 interactions
per day. This means that the activity level that DClaims needs to
support, per day, per news organization, is 303637 interactions,
which corresponds to the activity level per post, multiplied by the
number of posts.
Fixed Values
Ethereum Fiat Value (USD) 631
Publisher’s Batch Size 100
Transaction Gas Price (Gwei, nanoEther) 3
Results
Batch filling time (min) 23
Transaction Confirmation Time (min) 5
Price per Transaction (USD) 0,25
Table 2: Ethereum price calculations
6.2 Estimation of DClaims Costs
From the values presented in Table 1, we estimate the resources
consumed by a publisher in order to withstand the load of a news
website. We assumed that the volume and rate of web annotations
received per news outlet equals those of the news Facebook pages.
We make the calculations for a single news organization and sepa-
rate our estimations into the three types of paid resources: storage,
computing power and Ethereum transactions.
Storage: To calculate the necessary storage of our system, we
started by calculating the storage cost of individual annotations.
We used the data format from the W3C Web Annotation standard,
and placed a string with 148 characters (average length of Face-
book comment) inside each annotation. We calculated that each
claim occupied 30KB of storage. From that point, we computed the
storage cost per year using AWS pricing for EBS General Purpose
SSD[5]. This resulted in the value of USD 2203 in storage costs.
Computation: To calculate the computation costs, we started by
calculating the number of requests our system would have to pro-
cess, and then stress-tested a publisher server to evaluate howmany
servers would be necessary per news outlet. From there we could
calculate the annual cost. Our server was able to handle 25 requests
per second. We used Table 1’s Average number of interactions (per
post, per day) to estimate the number of requests per second we
would receive per news article, to then see howmany active articles
one server would support. We used Table 1’s Average number of
interactions (per post, per day) to estimate the number of requests
per second we would receive per news article, to then see how
many active articles one server would support. With each server
supporting 1500 requests per minute (25 per second), and the in-
teraction level per article being 4.2 per minute, each server could
serve around 357 active articles simultaneously. This number is
well above the Average number of posts (per page, per day) from
Table 1, which means that one server can serve the number of re-
quests expected per news website. The server used was Amazon
Web Service’s T2.2xlarge, which costs USD 1880 per year[3].
Ethereum transactions: To calculate the costs on Ethereum trans-
actions, three variables had to be fixed: (1) the value of Ether (the
Ethereum blockchain’s currency) in fiat currency, USD (value con-
sulted on April 26th, 2018, from [16]), (2) the size of the batch the
publishers would use, and (3) the Gas Price for the Ethereum trans-
action confirmation. The selected values and results are shown in
Table 2. To choose the gas price for our calculations, we used a pop-
ular website for Ethereum consumer metrics, EthGasStation [23]
(consulted on April 26th, 2018). We chose the standard value, 3
Gwei, for it is a good compromise between waiting time and price.
30 minutes was too long to wait, and 5 Gwei was too expensive. we
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Final Costs
Storage 2203
Computation 1880
Ethereum 277069
Total cost for 1 year 281152
Useful Metrics
Cost per 1000 Claims (USD) 2,54
Cost per User for 2,7M users (USD) 1,041
Table 3: Final cost analysis per news outlet
know from Table 1 that the number of interactions per article is 4.2
per minute, which means a batch of size 100 would take 23 minutes
to fill and would reduce the transaction cost per claim by a factor of
100 (when compared to one transaction per claim). 23 minutes per
batch with a 100 fold reduction in cost is a good compromise, so the
selected batch size for this test was 100. Lastly, from the gas price
(3 Gwei) and batch size (100) values, we can calculate the yearly
cost in Ethereum transactions, which is of USD 277069.
6.3 Cost Analysis Findings
Table 3 presents themain findings of our study. Running theDClaims
system for one big news outlet, such as CNN, Fox News, BBC News
or The New York Times, would approximately cost USD 281152 per
year. This value was calculated for only one of these large news
outlets, so the value presented does not represent the real world
cost. However, even if we assume that around the world there are
30 news outlets the size of the ones analyzed, DClaims’ costs are
still significantly smaller than the ones for real-world systems with
a donation based financial model, such as Wikipedia.
In perspective, these values are very reasonable. The Facebook
news pages analyzed have, on average, 27 million users. Even if we
assume that DClaims only attracts 1% of those users the cost per
user, per news outlet, would be less than USD 1 per year. DClaims
targets users who need to circumvent censorship. Many people
pay monthly fees for security services such as VPNs, ranging from
USD 5 to 10 per month, which equals USD 60 to USD 120 per year.
Therefore, if a donation based financial model such as Wikipedia
does not succeed, there is reason to believe a subscription-based
service, would. Thus, we infer there is both a market and a viable
financial model for third-parties willing to host DClaim publishers.
7 RELATEDWORK
Wepresent the relatedwork on areas concerning the building blocks
of DClaims and in censorship-resistant content dissemination.
Web annotation services: Genius Web Annotator [26] is a web
annotation system that allows for the annotation of any webpage,
provided that the user, or the webpage, supports the Genius plugin.
Hypothes.is [32] is similar to Genius, but implements a standard
data model of web annotations (from W3C), which increases in-
teroperability with other services. The main limitation of these
services is that all the data is stored on their servers, meaning they
offer no guarantees of persistence or availability. Moreover, having
full control over data means they can engage in censorship. Both
of these issues are addressed in DClaims.
IPFS-based systems: IPFS is an open-source project, with thou-
sands of contributors and in use in many decentralized projects,
such as market places [44] and identity systems [2], among others.
IPFS has also empowered censorship resistance efforts in the past,
one example being copying Wikipedia to IPFS, making it available
in Turkey, when the government blocked the website [1]. To our
knowledge, IPFS has not yet been used to store and transport web
annotations. Using IPFS for providing censorship resistant access
to web annotations is a good use of the system. However, there still
needs to be a registry to keep track of all this data, which is where
Ethereum smart-contracts become useful.
Blockchain technology: The blockchain technology was intro-
duced by Bitcoin [10, 27, 42]. Since then, there has been a lot of
research on blockchain and cryptocurrencies, mostly focused on
new consensus protocols [8, 20, 24, 41, 45], vulnerability assess-
ment [6, 10, 28], privacy [9, 12, 38] and some in social applica-
tions [4, 53]. Around the Ethereum blockchain has also borne an
ecosystem of applications that have used for many purposes [19].
The Ethereum applications that most relate to our work are the
ones which use smart-contracts as data registries, this is the case
with uPort [54], a decentralized identity platform and Ethereum
Name Service [21], a DNS-like system built on top of Ethereum.
The novelty in DClaims’ use of Ethereum is in the way scalability
is dealt with in the application layer, using the publisher network.
Other scalability solutions for Ethereum, such as sharding [22] and
side-chains [46] and state-channels [43], operate at lower levels.
Censorship-resistant content dissemination: Many decentral-
ized systems provide access to documents, implementing replication
and redundancy algorithms to circumvent censorship attempts by
content deletion [15, 48, 56, 57]. In Freenet [15], files are split into
chunks and spread out through several servers on the network.
The network is made of volunteered servers, each server offering
some amount of storage space. Tangler [56] operates in a similar
way. The key difference between these systems is that Tangler
makes it harder for servers to delete content deliberately. This is
because each file that is added to the network contains blocks of
other files already hosted. The result is that is a server deletes a
certain file, he will be affecting many other files, making it easy
for the network to detect the attack. Publius [57] also spreads files
through a network of servers, but since its main goal is privacy,
files are encrypted. In contrast to DClaims, these systems offer no
disincentives to misbehavior. Marty et al. [39] attempt to solve this
issue by introducing a cryptographic proof of censorship, but it
requires all the content stored to be encrypted, which is undesirable
in the context of DClaims, as everyone should have access to the
information. DClaims offers a different way to deal with bad actors.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper presents DClaims, a decentralized web annotations plat-
form which is resistant to censorship. DClaims stores data in a dis-
tributed network and keeps a registry of metadata on the Ethereum
blockchain, which is a tamper-proof, permanent record of informa-
tion. To address the limitations of blockchain technology, DClaims
uses a small network of dedicated nodes called publishers. We built
a reference implementation of the system on the form of a browser
extension, which allows for the web annotation of news websites,
allowing users to classify news articles, and view the classifications
made by others. Our evaluation shows DClaims can support the
same level of activity of Facebook’s news organizations pages.
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